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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

DRL § 211:

Amendment spurs conflict.

Domestic Relations Law section 211 was amended in 1968 to
3
add a provision governing temporary alimony and counsel fees.
The language of the amendment has caused conflicting decisions in
two recent supreme court cases.
84
In Morrison v. Morrison,
the Supreme Court, Queens County,
held that under the new amendment an application for temporary
alimony and counsel fees is to be made to the court and thus
awarded the relief requested, despite the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. The court cited the amendment to section 211
and Article 11-B in support of its holding.
In Krakower v. Krakower,8 5 the Supreme Court, New York
County, took issue with the Morrison holding and also with the
Nassau County rules which similarly provide that such application
is to be made to the court. The court drew upon the legislative
intent behind the enactment of Articles 11-A and 11-B, which provide for conciliation procedures, and specifically section 215-e of
the DRL, in holding that the application must be made to the
conciliation commissioner.
It would seem that the clear mandate of DRL 215-e, requiring
that the application be made to the conciliation commissioner, has
not been affected by the amendment of DRL 211. It is submitted
that the amendment as it is presently worded merely allows a
petition for temporary alimony and counsel fees to be served with
the summons and complaint.8 6
GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAw
GML § 50-e: Service upon Superintendent of Schools not
sufficient against Board of Education.
General Municipal Law section 50-e provides that, in a suit
against a public corporation, notice of claim must be served within
83The amendment to section 211 added, in part, the following language:
• . . provided, however, a notice of petition and petition to the court
for temporary alimony, child support and counsel fees, based on
financial ability and need only, may be served with such summons
or any time prior to the termination of such conciliation proceedings.
'44 160 N.Y.L.J. 18
(Sup. Ct. Queens County Sept. 17, 1968).
s 58 Misc. 2d 345, 295 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968).
8s See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1968, Leg. Mem. at 2309, where the statement
in support of the amendment to DRL 211 noted:
The bill would authorize service of motion papers for temporary
alimony, child support and counsel fees, based on financial ability
and need only, simultaneously with the service of a summons, or
at any time prior to the termination of conciliation proceedings.
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90 days after the claim arises upon a person "designated by law
as a person to whom a summons in an action in the supreme court
issued against such party may be delivered."
Under CPLR 311(7) and Education Law section 3813, the
person designated to receive service of such notice in a suit against
a Board of Education is a member or trustee of the Board of
Education or the" Board's clerk. The Superintendent of Schools,
although a "school officer" under section 2(13) of the Education
Law, is not a member of the Board of Education under sections
2(14), 1702(2), and 1711(2).
In Bayer v. Board of Education,' 7 an unwary plaintiff was
caught in the trap created by the present statutory requirements.
There, a young child was injured during school gymnastic exercises.
The child's parent immediately sent a letter to the Superintendent
of Schools. In his reply, the Superintendent acknowledged receipt
of the plaintiff's letter and also stated that he had referred the
matter to the school insurance agency. The insurance agency began
an investigation and took a written statement from the injured
plaintiff. All of this occurred within 90 days of the injury.
The Supreme Court, Nassau County, while realizing the inequity involved, felt compelled to dismiss the complaint because
the notice of the claim had not been actually received by the persons
designated under the statute. Even though it was recognized that
the statutory purpose of affording a municipality the opportunity
to conduct an early investigation had been fulfilled in the case,
the complaint was dismissed. A legislative revision of the relevant
statutes was advocated.
Another potential solution to the problems created by the
notice of claim provision was exhibited in Quintero v. L.I.R.R. ss
There, the Supreme Court, Kings County, applied CPLR 200489 to
extend the time allowed to file the requisite notice of claim.
Quintero would allow a judge to have limited discretion in permitting the late filing of a claim "upon such terms as may be just
and upon good cause shown."
It would seem appropriate for the legislature to restudy the
effect of this statute with a view towards revision so as to effect
its announced purpose and to alleviate the present situation where
87

58 Misc. 2d 259, 295 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).

88 55 Misc. 2d 813, 286 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968);

See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
302, 349-51 (1968).
89 CPLR 2004 provides:
Except where otherwise expressly prescribed by law, the court may
extend the time fixed by any statute, rule or order for doing any act,
upon such terms as may be just and upon good cause shown, whether
the application for extension is made before or after the expiration
of the time fixed.
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"honest claims may still be defeated on a technicality rather than
on the merits."

GML § 50-e:

90

Service of notice on water district not required.

General Municipal Law section 50-i requires that the notice,
contemplated by section 50-e, is to be given when plaintiff intends
to bring an action against "a city, county, town, village, fire district
or school district. .

....

In Martin v. Town of Esopus,91 plaintiff allegedly failed to
serve a notice of claim upon the defendant Port Ewen Water
District. Upon a motion to dismiss the complaint the court reasoned
that section 50-i was intended to qualify the reference to public
corporations contained in section 50-e. As a water district is not
directly covered by 50-i, the court concluded that no notice of claim
was required to be served on the water district.
The decision is in accord with current case law holding a
water district to be without the scope of section 50-i.2

0058 Misc. 2d at 261, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 133 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1968).

See also The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43

ST.

JoHN's L. REv. 498, 532-33 (1969).

9157 Misc. 2d 487, 293 N.Y.S.2d 571 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1968).
02 Harrigan v. Town of Smithtown, 54 Misc. 2d 793, 283 N.Y.S.2d 424
(Sup. Ct Suffolk County 1967).

